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Introduction 
 
1. Notion of media and technological convergence 
The word ‘media’ is often used to refer undertakings that operate means or channels of 
social communication, information or entertainment, including press, radio, television, and 
online communication, as well as, in a broader sense, cinema, advertising, publishing, 
music, film and audiovisual production, and distribution (press, books, cinema, etc). 
Technological convergence and changes brought by the Internet may require the concept 
of media to be redefined, in the sense that the internet offers a single online digital medium 
as a complement, or as a substitute, to a variety of means of communication. As Walden 
puts it, 
 
‘the development of the internet is causing a fundamental shift in the nature of the 
media industry and, as a consequence, calling into focus the suitability of existing 
governing laws and regulation, including media ownership rules. It can be argued, 
for example, that given an individual’s potential capability to reach a global audience 
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through the internet, ownership controls no longer make sense as a tool of 
pluralism.’1 
 
Nonetheless, despite the impact of the Internet on traditional media and in particular the 
migration to the electronic environment, media are still operating through the traditional 
channels. 
 
2. Sources that guarantee the preservation of the plurality of the ‘media’ in 
Portugal 
The preservation of the plurality of the ‘media’ in Portugal is guaranteed by several legal 
sources. 
To begin with, the Constitution of the Portuguese Republic provides for in Article 38(4) 
on freedom of press and other media that the State guarantees freedom and independence 
of media from political and economic power, and establishes the principle of specialty for 
undertakings that hold bodies of general information and treating and supporting them in a 
non discriminatory way and preventing their concentration namely through multiple and 
cross participations. Moreover, the Constitution also provides for in Article 39 that media 
regulation, concerning namely concentrations, is implemented by an independent 
administrative authority, the ERC (Entidade Reguladora para a Comunicação Social)2. 
Then, plurality of the media is addressed by several media statutes, namely the 
provisions of the former Television Act on media concentration and ownership 
transparency3, which are still in force as they have not been repealed by the new Television 
Act4, as well as the Press Act5, and the Radio Act6. 
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At the EU level, the respect for the preservation of the plurality of the media is provided 
for the Charter of Fundamental Rights (Art. 11(2)). 
At the international level, Portugal has approved and ratified the Convention on Cultural 
Diversity, adopted in Paris on 20 October 2005, which provides that the Parties have the 
sovereign right to adopt policies and measures to protect and to promote the diversity of 
cultural expressions within their territories, including the stimulation of media diversity. 
 
3. Rationale of the plurality of the media 
Pluralism of the media is an essential condition of basic civil rights in a democratic 
society7 such as the right to information and freedom of expression and confrontation of 
opinions, as well as an important means of preservation of language and cultural diversity. 
Media plurality is generally conceived as information independence and confrontation of 
opinions, mainly on political and economical issues, and it is seen as an ‘internal plurality’ 
in the sense that each newspaper and radio or television operator is supposed to be 
independent and to assure pluralism of ideas and opinions. 
 
 
Part I. Media Regulations and ‘Anti-Concentration’ Measures 
 
4. Anti-concentration measures in Portugal: background and rationale 
In Portugal there are anti-concentration measures specific of the media sector which are 
aimed to implement the basic principles and rules of the Constitution. 
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Concerning TV undertakings, the Media Regulatory Authority (ERC) issues a previous 
binding opinion in mergers assessed by the Competition Authority. However, those binding 
opinions can only be negative in case merger operations present grounded risks for freedom 
of expression and plurality of opinion8. A similar solution had already been provided for 
concerning mergers of press undertakings9. 
Concentrations of radio broadcasting undertakings require a previous authorization from 
the Media Regulatory Authority10, and they are to be denied in case it manifestly affects 
freedom of expression and plurality of opinion. 
Reference to a person’s right to information, as opposed to the mere assertion of the 
principle of the freedom of expression, is not expressly provided for as an alternative 
justification for anti-concentration measures. 
 
5. Scope of application 
The Constitution provides basic principles for media regulation (Arts. 37 to 40), and texts 
specific to the media sector are limited to some media, in particular to those known as 
traditional media (press, radio and television). 
The Press Act aims to guarantee the constitutional freedom of press11, including the right 
to inform, to get information and to be informed without impediment or discrimination, 
including the prohibition of any sort of censorship12. Limits to freedom of press can only be 
imposed in order to safeguard rigor and objectivity of information, to guarantee personality 
rights (e.g. name, privacy, image), and to defend the public interest and democratic order13. 
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On the other hand, the new Television Act14 provides for that the television activity is 
aimed at: contributing to the information, formation and entertainment of the public (a), 
and promoting the right to inform, to get information and to be informed, in rigorous and 
independent conditions and without impediment nor discriminations (b), promoting 
citizenship and democratic participation and to respect political, social and cultural 
pluralism (c), and diffusing and promoting Portuguese language and culture, as well as 
Portuguese creators, artists and scientists, and the values that express national identity15. 
 
6. Requirements of application of measures anti-concentration measures 
The conditions to the application of the media anti-concentration measures are generally 
the same as the conditions to the application of the merger control provided for by the 
Competition Act16. The notion of concentration is linked to the notion of control, which 
refers to both direct and indirect control, including the power to determine influence. 
According to the Portuguese Competition Act17, control shall be constituted by any act, 
irrespective of the form which it takes, which, separately or jointly and having regard to the 
circumstances of fact or law involved, implies the ability to exercise a determinant influence 
on an undertaking’s activity, in particular: acquisition of all or part of the share capital (a); 
acquisition of rights of ownership, use or enjoyment of all or part of an undertaking’s assets 
(b); acquisition of rights or the signing of contracts which grant a decisive influence over the 
composition or decision-making of an undertaking’s corporate bodies (c). 
Moreover, according to a (still in force) provision of the former TV Act, acquisitions of 
shareholdings in legal TV operator undertakings, or applicants to a TV license, by other TV 
operator undertakings have to be notified to the Media Regulatory Authority, where they do 
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not represent a concentration operation subject to previous notification under competition 
law18. However, despite an obligation to notify is imposed on the undertakings, the Media 
Authority is not expressly empowered to authorize or to prohibit this type of concentrations.  
On the other hand, the Radio Act provides additional anti-concentration measures. For 
example, the number of radio operators in which a person may hold a share is limited to 5 
and no company can own more than a 25% share in two or more stations that operate in the 
same municipality19. Transactions that change the control of a radio licensed undertaking 
can only take place 3 years after the issuance of the license or one year after its last 
renovation and it is subject to previous authorization from the Media Regulatory 
Authority20. The existence of undertaking control is assessed by the possibility to exercise a 
determinant influence over its activity, namely through the existence of rights of disposal 
over any of its assets or rights that grant the power to determine the composition or the 
decisions of its bodies21. 
Then, in order to implement the constitutional principle of transparency of media 
ownership22, media specific statutes also provide for measures concerning transparency 
ownership of media undertakings23. For example, for purposes of the TV regulation, a 
qualified shareholding is deemed to exist when it enables a significant influence over the 
undertaking management, and it is presumed to exist where it corresponds to 10% of the 
capital of the company or to 10% voting of the voting rights therein24. 
Finally, concerning communication conglomerates, it should also be added that 
ownership of media undertakings holding bodies of general information is subject to the 
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constitutional principle of specialty, meaning that their operations are limited to the media 
sector25.  
 
7. Implementation and enforcement competence 
Those specific media regulations are implemented in first instance by the sector-specific 
authority, the Media Regulatory Authority (ERC). Nonetheless, merger control of media 
undertakings is enforced by the Competition Authority, which must take into account the 
previous binding opinion of the Media Regulatory Authority (ERC). This binding opinion 
can only deny a media merger where it places serious risks to freedom of expression and 
confrontation of different trends of opinion. 
 
8. Sanctions for non-compliance 
Aside competition law sanctions, there are provisions specific to the media. To begin 
with, an administrative fine between ten thousand and one hundred Euros is provided for 
those who exceed the maximum amount of shareholdings in radio operators, as well as to 
radio operator undertakings involved in concentration or transfer of shares operations that 
do not comply with the obligations to communicate such operations to the Media 
Authority26.  
Then, concerning TV operators, undertakings that do not comply with the obligation to 
notify operations of transfers of shares to the Media Authority were subject to an 
administrative fine between twenty thousand and one-hundred and fifty thousand Euros27. 
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Part II. Other Ways to Guarantee the Plurality of the Media 
 
9. Obligations of contents (variety of programs, broadcasting quotas, 
broadcast access right, reply right …) on the operators 
Operators have to comply with obligations of content concerning namely variety of 
programs, broadcasting quotas, broadcast access right, right of reply, etc. For example, the 
Television Act provides for limits to the freedom of programming (Art. 27), acquisition of 
exclusive rights (Art. 32), as well as a set of general obligations concerning broadcasting of 
diversified and plural programs, objective information, diffusion of creative works or 
European origin, including in Portuguese, and to guarantee namely the right of reply (Art. 
34). Moreover, limits to advertising are also provided for (Art. 40). 
 
10. Allocation of public funds and the respect of plurality. 
The Constitution provides for in Article 38(5) that the State guarantees the existence and 
functioning of a radio and television public service. 
Concerning television, there is a system of allocation of public funds in order to finance 
the broadcasting public service in proportional and transparent conditions and with a 
refunding control mechanism28. It is limited to what is strictly necessary to the functioning 
of the public service and a refunding control mechanism is provided for, as well as the 
statutory provision that the concession contract of the public service must prevent the 
concessionaire from adopting practices that are not justified by the rules of the market and 
which lead to the increase of costs or to the reduction of income29. 
Despite the allocation of public funds is not expressly subject to the respect of plurality of 
requirements, it does actually contribute to the respect of the plurality or at least participate 
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in guaranteeing the respect of plurality, as one of the basic principles that justifies the 
existence of a public service is to guarantee media pluralism30. 
As far as press and radio are concerned, there is a system of allocation of public funds to 
promote in non discriminatory terms the possibilities of expression and confrontation of 
different trends of opinion31.  
 
 
Part III. Competition Law 
 
11. Competition Law in Portugal: background and constitutive parts 
The Portuguese Competition Act is provided for Law 18/2003 of 11 July32. In Portugal 
there is a Competition Act since 1983. It has been enacted by Decree-Law 422/83 of 3 
December33. This statute has been repealed by Decree-Law 370/93 of 29 October34, which 
has later been repealed by the currently in force competition regulation enacted by Law 
18/2003 of 11 July (Competition Act). 
The main constitutive parts of Portuguese competition law are anti-competitive behavior 
(cartels, i.e. agreements, decisions of associations and concerted practices of undertakings, 
and trusts, i.e. abuse of dominant position) and mergers (concentrations). A provision on 
state aid is also provided for in the Competition Act. 
Moreover, as a member State of the European Union (EU), Portugal is bound to the EU 
competition rules35 concerning competitive behavior (cartels, i.e. agreements, decisions of 
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associations and concerted practices of undertakings), trusts (i.e. abuse of dominant 
position), and state aid, as well as EC merger control, in special the Merger Regulation36. 
 
12. Enforcement of competition rules. 
The Competition Authority (Autoridade da Concorrência) is in charge of implementing 
national competition rules regarding both anti-competitive behavior and merger control37, 
as well as EU competition rules concerning anti-competitive behavior38. 
Nonetheless, concerning areas subject to sector-specific regulation, the Competition 
Authority and the sector-specific regulatory authorities work together to apply the 
competition legislation, in accordance with Chapter III of the Competition Act39. 
 
13. Application of competition rules to the various media (press, radio, 
television, Internet) 
In principle, Portuguese competition rules can be applied to the various media (press, 
radio, television, internet…) as the Competition Act ‘is applicable to all economic activities 
carried out on a permanent or occasional basis in the private, public or co-operative 
sectors’40. Moreover, several media statutes provide for the application of the competition 
regulation41. 
However, concerning merger control, the Competition Authority asks the respective 
regulatory authority to state its opinion, within a reasonable period and without affecting 
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the exercise by the sector regulatory authorities of the powers that, within the scope of their 
specific duties, are legally conferred on them in relation to the concentration in question42.  
Concerning TV undertakings, the decision of the Competition Authority is bound to the 
binding previous opinion to be issued by the Media Regulatory Authority (ERC), which 
nonetheless can only be negative in case such merger operations present grounded risks for 
freedom of expression and plurality of opinion43. A similar solution had already been 
provided for mergers of press undertakings44. Concentrations of radio broadcasting 
undertakings require a previous authorization to be issued by the Media Regulatory 
Authority45, which is to be denied in case freedom of expression and plurality of opinion is 
seriously at stake. 
 
14. Type of merger control implemented in Portugal. 
A compulsory prior control is provided for concentrations which either create or 
reinforce a share exceeding 30% of the national market for a particular good or service or 
for a substantial part of it or when in the preceding financial year, the group of undertakings 
taking part in the concentration have recorded in Portugal a turnover exceeding € 150 
million, net of directly related taxes, provided that the individual turnover in Portugal of at 
least two of these undertakings exceeds two million euro46. 
Such concentrations are to be notified to the Competition Authority within seven working 
days of conclusion of the agreement or, where relevant, by the publication date of the 
announcement of a takeover bid, an exchange offer or a bid to acquire a controlling interest. 
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Moreover, a concentration subject to prior notification cannot be put into effect before it 
has been notified and explicitly or tacitly decided in terms of non-opposition47.  
 
15. Notion of ‘concentration’ (determining influence or control) 
Portuguese competition law provides for a notion of concentration which includes not 
only mergers between two or more previously independent undertakings but also those 
cases where one or more individuals who already have control of at least one or more 
undertakings acquire control, directly or indirectly, of the whole or parts of one or several 
other undertakings48. 
Portuguese competition law seems to favor a broad conception of concentration. Despite 
it is based on the notion of control, this notion refers to both direct and indirect control, 
including the power to determine influence. In fact, control shall be constituted by any act, 
irrespective of the form which it takes, which, separately or jointly and having regard to the 
circumstances of fact or law involved, implies the ability to exercise a determining influence 
on an undertaking’s activity, in particular: acquisition of all or part of the share capital (a); 
acquisition of rights of ownership, use or enjoyment of all or part of an undertaking’s assets 
(b); acquisition of rights or the signing of contracts which grant a decisive influence over the 
composition or decision-making of an undertaking’s corporate bodies (c)49. 
The acquisition of shareholdings or assets under the terms of a special procedure of 
corporate rescue or bankruptcy, the acquisition of a shareholding merely as a guarantee, 
and the acquisition by credit institutions of shareholdings in non-financial undertakings, 
where such acquisition is not covered by the prohibition in Article 101 of the General 
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Regulation on Credit Institutions and Financial Institutions50, are not held to constitute a 
concentration between undertakings51. 
 
16. Assessment of joint ventures and other alliances. 
A joint venture is assessed as a merger in case the establishment or acquisition of a joint 
undertaking is deemed a concentration between undertakings, i.e. provided that the joint 
undertaking fulfils the functions of an independent economic entity on a lasting basis52. 
Otherwise, joint ventures and other alliances are assessed with regard to rules on cartels53.  
 
17. Assessment test? 
Market dominance is the criterion of the assessment test laid down by the Portuguese 
Competition Act. Concentrations that neither create nor strengthen a dominant position 
that results in significant barriers to effective competition in the Portuguese market or in a 
substantial part of it are to be authorized (a) where those that create or strengthen a 
dominant position that results in significant barriers to effective competition in the 
Portuguese market or in a substantial part of it are to be prohibited (b)54. 
In order to appraise the effects of notified concentrations on the competition structure, 
with a view to preserve and develop effective competition in the Portuguese market, in the 
interests of the intermediate and final consumer, the Competition Authority takes into 
account several factors, namely: the structure of the relevant markets and the existence or 
absence of competition from undertakings established in such markets or in distinct 
markets (a); the position of undertakings participating in the relevant market or markets 
and their economic and financial power, in comparison with their main competitors (b); the 
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potential competition and the existence, in law or in fact, of entry barriers to the market (c); 
the opportunities for choosing suppliers and users (d); the access of the different 
undertakings to supplies and markets (e); the structure of existing distribution networks (f); 
supply and demand trends for the products and services in question (g); special or exclusive 
rights granted by law or attached to the nature of the products traded or services provided 
(g); the control of essential infrastructure by the undertakings in question and the access 
opportunities to such infrastructure offered to competing undertakings (i); technical and 
economic progress provided that it is to the consumer’s advantage and does not create an 
obstacle to competition (j); the contribution that the concentration makes to the 
international competitiveness of the Portuguese economy (l). 
 
18. Relevance of the use of commitments as remedies. 
The Competition Authority may decide not to oppose to the concentration provided that 
the authors of the notification accept commitments and establish conditions and obligations 
intended to guarantee compliance with such commitments with a view to ensuring that 
effective competition is maintained55. Such commitments can be either structural or 
behavioral. 
 
19. Sanction for the failure to notify a merger subject to prior control. 
Merger control is actually implemented as mergers are usually notified to the Competition 
Authority. This has a significant record of merger control decisions, including in the media 
sector56. 
                                                          
55 Competition Act, Article 35(3). 
56 Ver http://www.concorrencia.pt. 
Failure to notify a concentration subject to prior notification is deemed an administrative 
offence with a fine that may not exceed 1% of the previous year’s turnover for each of the 
undertakings57. 
 
 
Part IV. Relationships between Media Specific Rules and Competition Rules: 
Anti-Concentration Measures and Merger Control 
 
20. Mode of implementation of the various sets of rules (media-specific rules, 
Competition Law rules). 
Media-specific rules and competition law rules are concurrently implemented where a 
merger is subject to previous notification to the Competition Authority. In these cases the 
Competition Authority has to request a previous binding opinion from the Media Authority. 
However, acquisitions of shareholdings in legal TV operator undertakings, or applicants 
to a TV license, by other TV operator undertakings have to be notified to the Media 
Regulatory Authority, where they do not represent a concentration operation subject to 
previous notification under competition law, according to a still in force provision of the 
former TV Act (Art. 4(3)). The same applies concerning transactions that change the control 
of a radio licensed undertaking which are subject to previous authorization from the Media 
Regulatory Authority (Art. 18(1)). 
 
21. Role of the enforcement authorities. 
If the only applicable regulation is the sector-specific regulation and no issue that may 
constitute an infringement to the Competition Act is assessed, the Competition Authority is 
not entitled to intervene on even a consultative basis. 
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In the case of a concurrent implementation, the Media Authority is the first to intervene. 
There is concurrent implementation where mergers are subject to previous notification to 
the Competition Authority. Nonetheless, the Competition Authority cannot decide without 
and against the previous binding of opinion of the Media Regulatory Authority (see supra 
15). 
On the other hand, in the case of a concurrent implementation, the Competition Act 
provides rules that allow the Competition Authority to ‘communicate’ with the Media 
Authority as a sector regulatory authority (Art. 15). To begin with, concerning anti-
competitive practices (cartels and trusts), the Media Regulatory Authority, as an 
independent administrative authority, has the duty to inform the Authority if it becomes 
aware of facts which may be described as restrictive competitive practices (Art. 24(2)). 
Then, the Competition Authority has to request the prior opinion of the Media Regulatory 
Authority, which is to be delivered within either a maximum of five working days 
concerning interim measures (Art. 27(4)) or a reasonable period of time prescribed by the 
Competition Authority concerning completion of the evidence-taking (Art. 28(2)). 
Moreover, Article 29 of the Competition Act provides specific rules of co-ordination with 
sector regulatory authorities. On one hand, whenever the Competition Authority is aware of 
facts occurring in the media sector, as an area subject to sector regulation, which may be 
described as practices restricting competition, it shall immediately report such facts to the 
Media Regulatory Authority for the subject matter, for the Media Authority to state its 
opinion within a reasonable period of time, to be set by the Competition Authority (Art. 
29(1)). On the other hand, whenever, within the scope of its attributions and without 
prejudice to the provisions of Article 24(2), the Media Regulatory Authority officially or at 
the request of regulated bodies assesses issues that may constitute an infringement to the 
Competition Act, it shall immediately inform the Competition Authority of the case and 
supply the essential facts (Art. 29(2)). And before reaching its final decision, the Media 
Regulatory Authority informs the Competition Authority of its draft proposals, so that the 
Competition Authority may state its opinion within a reasonable period of time prescribed 
by the Media Authority. 
 
Concerning mergers, Article 39 of the Competition Act provides detailed rules of co-
ordination with the Media Authority as a sector regulatory authority. To begin with, 
whenever a concentration of undertakings affects a media market, before reaching a 
decision before or after an in-depth investigation, the Competition Authority must ask the 
Media Authority to state its opinion, within a reasonable period prescribed by the Authority. 
According to the Press and Television Acts, the opinion of the Media Authority is binding, 
and it shall be negative in case the merger causes grounded risks to freedom of expression 
and plurality of opinion; a similar criterion is provided for in the Radio Act, by which the 
Media Authority is empowered to authorize mergers (see supra 15). 
 
22. Examples of mergers in the media sector examined at the European level. 
Several mergers in the media sector have been examined by the European authorities58. 
In the sector of book publishing and sales reference goes to the case Lagardère / Natexis / 
VUP case, in which the merger was approved subject to conditions imposed by the 
Commission to ensure effective competition in the French-language publishing market. 
Moreover, in the case of Sony / BMG, a joint venture combining the recorded music 
businesses of Sony and Bertelsmann, the European Commission approved the creation of 
the joint venture, after it concluded that it did not have sufficiently strong evidence to 
oppose the deal. However, this decision was later overturned by a European Court, when 
the Court of First Instance upheld a complaint from a group of independent record labels, 
saying the union of Sony Music and BMG required more scrutiny’. 
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Another example is the Télé2 decision. Under the EU Merger Regulation, the European 
Commission has approved the purchase of the fixed telephony and Internet access 
businesses of Télé2 France by the French mobile telephony operator SFR. This operation 
raised serious competition concerns in pay- TV markets in France and the Commission 
launched an in-depth investigation. These concerns have been addressed by commitments 
guaranteeing DSL operators equal treatment with the new entity as regards access to 
television content owned by the Vivendi group, of which SFR forms part. Based upon these 
commitments, the Commission authorized the merger, concluding that it would not 
significantly impede effective competition in the European Economic Area (EEA) or any 
substantial part of it.59 
 
23. Use of the provision of the EU regulation that allows the protection of 
justifiable interests (art. 21, § 4, Regulation n° 139/2004). 
The corresponding provision of the previous Merger Regulation60, which allowed also for 
the protection of justifiable interests, has been used by the Portuguese authorities not in the 
media but in the financial sector, in the case BSCH/Champalimaud, concerning the 
acquisition of a controlling interest in the Champalimaud group by Banco Santander 
Central Hispano (BSCH) of Spain. However, the Commission considered that the measures 
adopted by the Portuguese authorities to veto this acquisition on grounds of national 
interest had violated EU Internal Market and competition rules and therefore sued Portugal 
before the ECJ. Nonetheless, as Portugal withdrew the measures in question, the European 
Commission decided to close the two infringement procedures it had opened in 1999 
against Portugal in the so-called Champalimaud affair. 
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V. Other Rules that Guarantee the Plurality of the Media and Competition 
Rules 
 
24. Assessing the obligations (e.g. production and broadcasting quotas, 
‘media chronology’) that curtail competition … in the name of competition 
protection. 
Obligations that may curtail competition, such as production and broadcasting quotas 
and ‘media chronology’, are aimed at protecting other values such as cultural diversity and 
plurality of opinion. Therefore, they can hardly be assessed in the name of competition 
protection, as they are grounded upon different values of public interest.  
 
25. Allocation of public funds to guarantee the plurality of the media and its 
compatibility with competition requirements. 
The Portuguese Competition Act provides that ‘aid granted to undertakings by a state or 
any other public body must not significantly restrict or affect competition in the whole or in 
part of the market’ (Art. 13(1)). However, ‘compensatory payments made by the state in 
return for the provision of a public service, whatever the form of such payments, shall not 
be considered aid’ (Art. 13(3)). The Portuguese State makes compensatory payments to RTP 
in return for the provision of the TV and radio broadcasting public service as provided for 
by Law 30/2003 of 22 August. 
Accordingly, the allocation of public funds that consist of compensatory payments made 
by the state in return for the provision of the broadcasting public service are not considered 
state aid and therefore fall outside the scope of application of the state aid provision of the 
Competition Act. 
In what concerns the allocation of public funds that do not consist in such compensatory 
payments, they can be treated as state aid, meaning that they should not significantly 
restrict nor affect competition in the whole or in part of the market even if aimed to 
guarantee the plurality of the media. 
Nonetheless, the control mechanism provided for under the Competition Act to assess 
the conformity of such allocation of public funds with competition requirements is rather 
fragile, as the Competition Authority is only empowered to, at the request of any interested 
party, ‘scrutinize any aid or aid project and formulate such recommendations for the 
Government as it deems necessary to eliminate the negative effects on competition of such 
aid’61. Consequently, the Competition Authority cannot but to formulate recommendations 
to the Government and provided that any interested party has requested them. 
 
However, concerning the EU state aid control mechanism, the allocation of public funds 
to media undertakings may be deemed state aid for purposes of Article 107(1) of the TFUE 
(and related regulations) even if they consist of compensatory payments made by the state 
in return for the provision of the broadcasting public service.62 However, the assessment of 
this state aid must take into account that the undertaking is charged with a service of 
general economic interest as provided for under Article 106(2) of the Treaty. 
 
 
Part VI. Implementation of the Regulation 
 
26. Recent cases in the media sector examined by the Portuguese competition 
authority. 
The Competition Authority has examined several cases in the media sector. A more 
recent case concerning various areas is PRISA/ MEDIA CAPITAL (Proc. 54/2006). 
                                                          
61 Competition Act, Art. 31(2). 
62
The merger, notified on 7 November 2006, consisted of the projected acquisition of sole 
control of Grupo Media Capital SGPS, SA (‘MEDIA CAPITAL’) by Promotora de 
Informaciones SA (‘PRISA’), by means of a bid to purchase the shares representing its 
registered capital. 
PRISA was a Spanish-registered company listed on the stock exchange, which, as a 
holding company of Grupo Prisa, controlled a group of companies operating mainly in the 
sectors covering communications, education, culture and entertainment, mostly in Spain, 
but also in France and Latin America. In Portugal, Grupo Prisa operated in the sectors 
covering cable channel distribution, through Grupo Sogecable; school book publishing, 
through Constância Editores SA; and promotional marketing, through Prisa Innova SA. 
On the other hand, MEDIA CAPITAL was a listed company, under Portuguese law, 
which, as a holding company of Grupo Media Capital, held a group of companies that 
operated essentially in the sectors involving television, radio, outdoor advertising, as well as 
press and internet services in Portugal. 
Under Article 35 (1) (b) of the Competition Act, the Council of the Competition Authority 
has decided, on 29 December 2006, not to oppose the merger on the grounds that it was not 
likely to create or to reinforce a dominant position that might result in significant barriers 
to effective competition in the following markets: (i) the national market for advertising on 
open-signal television; (ii) the national radio advertising market; (iii) the national market 
for the supply of outdoor advertising space and (iv) the national market for music 
publishing and distribution.’ 
 
27. Specific problems regarding the demarcation of markets and the analysis 
of the organisation of markets. 
The Competition Authority faced specific problems regarding the demarcation of 
operated markets. 
To begin with, concerning TV broadcasting, the Authority distinguished free access (open 
signal) from conditional access TV taking into account different sources of income 
(advertising v. user subscription). The Competition Authority rejected the existence of an 
autonomous market for end viewers of TV open signal as a commercial connection was only 
established with advertisers. Therefore the relevant market in free access (open signal) TV 
consisted only of the advertising market.  
The Competition Authority identified also the market of acquisition of broadcasting 
rights. However, considering the residual presence of Media Capital in this market, as its 
own contents were mainly sold intra-group, the Competition Authority excluded this 
market from its analysis, and focused on the market of advertising in open signal TV. 
Moreover, for reasons of cultural diversity, language and regulatory specificities, the 
Competition Authority limited the geographical market to the Portuguese territory. 
Concerning radio broadcasting, the Competition Authority also limited the relevant 
market to advertising in radio broadcasting, as the relevant commercial transactions 
consisted of broadcasters selling advertising ‘air time’ to advertisers. The Competition 
Authority considered this to be an autonomous market from other advertising markets for 
technical and price reasons. Moreover, the Competition Authority held that, despite some 
radio operators of Media Capital had local or regional limited broadcast, the advertising 
effect had national reach and therefore the geographical market should be delimited by the 
Portuguese territory.  
Concerning outdoor advertising, the Competition Authority held this to be an 
autonomous and unitary market despite the diversity of means of outdoor advertising, 
reasoning that all those different means have in common to present an advertising message 
at a public place to a public in movement. The geographical scope of this market was also 
limited to the national territory because advertisers plan their advertising campaigns at 
national scale and the undertakings of this sector also operate at the national scale.  
Moreover, for purposes of this operation, the Competition Authority demarked the 
market of musical edition and distribution as an autonomous market, with geographical 
scope corresponding to the Portuguese territory. 
 
28. Specific problems related to the low number of operators on the markets. 
The market of advertising in open signal TV was considered to be concentrated, 
according to the IHH criterion, due to the low number of operators and the high share of 
Media Capital. Moreover, significant barriers to entry into this market existed as an 
administrative license to operate TV broadcasting both in open signal and cable distribution 
was required. Nonetheless, the Competition Authority considered that the operation 
consisted of a mere transmission of market shares between the merging undertakings 
without significantly affecting the market structure. In short, the merger was found not to 
create nor reinforce a dominant position which could cause significant impediments to 
competition within the market of advertising in open signal TV. 
A similar reasoning was applied to the markets of advertising in radio broadcasting, 
outdoor advertising and musical edition and distribution, in which, despite the low number 
of operators, barriers to entry were found to be not so significant. 
 
29. The use of commitments as remedies considering the characteristics of the 
sector involved. 
In the PRISA/MEDIA CAPITAL case no commitments have been used. In a different 
case, the projected merger Sonaecom/PT, the Competition Authority has conditioned the 
authorization of the concentration upon the acceptance of commitments. It was a case in 
the telecommunication sector but with ramifications into the media sector. In particular, 
the Authority conditioned the merger upon Sonaecom assuming a set of conditions 
concerning the media and content markets.  
In an earlier decision (case 47/2003, - PPTV / PT CONTEÚDOS / SPORT TV), the 
Competition Authority decided not to oppose the concentration on the grounds that, subject 
to the imposition of conditions tied to monitoring obligations, the concentration would not 
create or reinforce a dominant position that might result in significant barriers to 
competition in the Portuguese market for the television broadcasting rights of football 
matches and match summaries involving national teams, the distribution market for pay-
TV sports channels or the multimedia content market for football. 
This concentration involved the acquisition by the undertakings PPTV – Publicidade de 
Portugal e Televisão, SA (marketing of advertising and television rights), and PT Conteúdos, 
SGPS, SA (management of equity investments in other enterprises), of joint control of the 
commercial enterprise SPORT TV Portugal, SA (activity of television and broadcasting, and 
the acquisition and resale of television broadcasting rights for events, to produce, make and 
market programs on sporting events, for reference to them, and advertising and any 
activities that raise the commercial value of individuals and objects related to the different 
types of sports and other activities connected with those referred to above). The acquisition 
took place by means of the purchase, in equal parts, of the total investment hitherto held by 
RTP (Rádio e Televisão de Portugal, SGPS, SA) in SPORT TV PORTUGAL, SA., 
accompanied by SPORT TV’s acquisition and exclusive exercise of the broadcasting rights 
for the main division matches in the National Football Championship for the seasons 
2004/2005 to 2007/2008. 
 
In a more recent case - Ongoing/Vertix 63 -, the Media Authority issued a legal opinion 
against a projected merger which would result of the acquisition of a significant part of the 
shares (35%) of a relevant media company (Media Capital) by another one in the sector 
(Ongoing), which already had a dominant position in a third media company (Impresa). 
                                                          
63 See non confidential version available at http://www.erc.pt. 
The Media Authority held that in order to assure pluralism and diversity of opinion by 
means of controlling media concentrations, Ongoing could only acquire joint control of 
Media Capital in case it would hold less than 1% of Impresa’s shares and refrain from 
directly or indirectly interfere in its internal affairs, either social, editorial or else.  
The Media Authority found out that the sectors of open signal TV and information 
channels distributed by cable and the production of TV contents to be those in which the 
risks to diversity and plurality of media would be more sensitive, as Ongoing would be at 
the same time in a position of joint control of Media Capital and of privileged access to 
confidential information of Impresa, where both companies had a joint dominance of the 
market (for ex. 75% of advertising). The Media Authority based the imposition that Ongoing 
should have less than 1% of Impresa’s as a means to prevent the diversity of TV programs to 
be affected. 
 
30. Concurrent implementation of Competition Law (merger control) and the 
sector-specific regulation (anti-concentration measures). 
In PRISA/ MEDIA CAPITAL, both the ERC (Media Regulatory Authority) and the 
ANACOM (National Communications Authority) did not object to the projected merger, 
and the Competition Authority also cleared the merger from the viewpoint of competition 
law. 
In the PPTV/PT CONTEÚDOS/SPORT TV case, the Media Authority held that the 
concentration would aggravate the situation of risk concerning external pluralism, as it 
would make harder and delay the possibility of entry of operators in the market due namely 
to the conditions imposed to RTP and the long term of the exclusive broadcasting rights. 
Nonetheless, the Media Authority decided not to issue a previous negative opinion on the 
concentration, reasoning that it would not cause a reduction of the number nor the quality 
of the events of general interest as sport events previously held by RTP would remain 
available on the market, and that the relevant provisions of the Television Act in force 
would not be infringed. Moreover, the Media Authority emphasized as a positive effect the 
socialization of those broadcasting rights previously held by RTP and now available on the 
market on an offer-and-demand basis.64 
Taking into account the opinion of the Media Authority, in particular the danger for 
external plurality of media, the Competition Authority did not prohibit the concentration, 
but imposed commitments and obligations to ensure compliance with competition rules. 
 
In a different recent case, IMPRESA, the media sector-specific authority (ERC) assessed 
whether the merger would affect the plurality of opinion. In particular, addressing the issue 
of external plurality, the ERC reasoned that a condition for such plurality of opinion to take 
place would be the existence of different autonomous undertakings operating in the market. 
The authority found that the projected merger would not reduce the number of players in 
the market as the acquirer undertaking was only replacing the acquired.65 
 
31. Conceptual convergences and divergences between Competition Law and 
sector-specific regulations. 
The Media Authority establishes a close connection between (external) plurality of media 
and the structure of the market reasoning that a competitive structure of the market is a 
decisive factor for plurality of media. A point of divergence between competition law and 
sector-specific regulations may be found in the so-called internal plurality concerning 
quality and diversity of content which is not by itself guaranteed by competition law. 
 
 
                                                          
64 See Decision of Council of the Competition Authority, at p. 14, at http://www.concorrencia.pt. 
65 See final decision in Portuguese, pp. 23-24, available at http://www.concorrencia.pt. 
  
Part VI. Prospects and Improvements 
 
32. Efficiency of anti-concentration measures. 
The decision praxis of the Media Authority seems to indicate that the media sector anti-
concentration specific measures concerning the so-called external plurality are somehow 
redundant as media pluralism is closely connected with the competitive structure of the 
market. It is possible however that, despite the competitive structure of the market, a 
merger endangers freedom of expression and media pluralism from the viewpoint of the so-
called internal pluralism. 
 
33. Towards a European anti-concentration regulation? 
In December 2007, the Audiovisual Media Services Directive66 entered into force, 
extending the scope of the EU audiovisual regulation to emerging media services, but no 
anti-concentration measures specific to the media sector are provided therein. However: 
‘Responding to continuing political concerns about media concentration, and its possible 
effects on pluralism and freedom of expression, the Commission launched a three-step 
approach for advancing the debate on media pluralism across the European Union in 
2007.’67 And Directive 2010/13/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 
March 2010, repealed Council Directive 89/552/EEC. 
On the other hand, the Merger Regulation does provide that pluralism of media is a 
legitimate interest for the protection of which Member States can adopt adequate measures 
                                                          
66 Directive 2007/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2007 amending 
Council Directive 89/552/EEC on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or 
administrative action in Member States concerning the pursuit of television broadcasting activities; OJ L 332 
of 18 December 2007. 
67 http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/media_taskforce/pluralism/index_en.htm. 
concerning a concentration with community dimension that has been declared compatible 
with the internal market by the European Commission (Regulation 134/2004, Art. 23(4)). 
In Portugal, a new Act on Media Pluralism and Non Concentration has been approved by 
the Parliament but it has later been vetoed by the President68. 
 
34. Requirements of internal plurality (e.g. variety of information sources, 
variety of the programming, variety in the production, speaking times of the 
various currents of thoughts) and/or anti-concentration measures specific to 
the media sector? 
Variety of information sources, programming and production as well as speaking times of 
the various trends of thought are crucial requirements of internal plurality of the media. 
These requirements of internal plurality appear to be decisive for the Media Authority, in 
the sense that a concentration that does not affect internal plurality did not receive a 
negative opinion from the Media Authority despite it aggravated the situation of risk 
concerning the so-called external plurality of the media (case PPTV / PT CONTEÚDOS / 
SPORT TV). In short, anti-concentration measures specific to the media sector aimed at 
guaranteeing structural (external) plurality of media do not seem to be determinant from 
the viewpoint of the Media Authority.  
On the other hand, taking into account that the Media Authority usually assesses the 
risks to freedom of expression and (external) plurality of media posed by mergers upon the 
competitive structure of the market, the anti-concentration measures specific to the media 
sector appear somehow redundant. Nonetheless, anti-concentration measures are also 
aimed at controlling the internal plurality of media, which is not provided for by 
competition law itself. 
                                                          
68 See http://www.gmcs.pt. 
In short, plurality of media is a sensitive issue and not only a competition law problem, 
as media regulation is aimed at preserving and promoting other values of public interest. 
This is acknowledged by the EC Merger Regulation according to which Member States may 
adopt adequate measures to protect legitimate interests, such as media pluralism, 
concerning mergers with community dimension which have been declared compatible with 
the internal market, provided such measures are proportionate and fully compatible with all 
aspects of Community law. 
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